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Jarratt: Estates, Trusts, and Wills

ESTATES, TRUSTS AND WILLS
David C. Jarratt
INTRODUCTION

This survey, unlike the other surveys in this issue of the Montana Law Review, examines cases decided in both 1980 and 1981 in
the area of estates, trusts, and wills. This survey does not consider
all cases, instead, it deals only with the more important decisions.
Of particular interest are cases interpreting the Montana Uniform
Probate Code (MUPC) in the areas of canceled wills, homestead
allowance, exempt property, and fees and expenses in will contests.
The survey also discusses recent cases dealing with undue influence and discriminatory trusts.
I.

PRESUMPTION IN CANCELED WILL CASES

Estate of Cox,' a case of first impression in Montana, concerns
will cancellation. The decedent left a single-page holographic will,
entirely in her own handwriting, which was found in her bedroom
nightstand. Eight large Xs had been drawn on the page so that all
the paragraphs, with the exception of a small paragraph on the
side of the page, had markings through them or partially through
them. In addition, the words "Will and Testimony," which began
the will, had three lines drawn through them.
The supreme court held that the acts of cancellation were sufficient to revoke the will under the MUPC requirements.2 The primary question in such cases is whether the required intent to revoke can be found or implied. In Cox, the court ruled that where a
will has been in the custody of the testator and is discovered
among her effects in a canceled or defaced condition, the testator
is presumed to have done the act with the intent to revoke.' The
proponent of the will then has the burden of going forward with
sufficient evidence regarding relevant factors and circumstances to
rebut the presumption.
What circumstances can be raised by a proponent of an allegedly canceled will to rebut the Cox presumption? The court in Cox
states one possible factor: if the will contestants had a fleeting op1. Mont. -,
621 P.2d 1057 (1981).
2. MONTANA CODE ANNOTATED [hereinafter cited as MCA] § 72-2-321 (1981) states that
"a will or any part thereof is revoked: . . .(2) by being burned, torn, canceled, obliterated,
or destroyed with the intent and for the purpose of revoking it by the testator or by another
person in his presence and by his direction."
3. by
Cox,ScholarWorks
Mont. -, at
621
P.2d at 1061.
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portunity to tamper with the will, that fact will be considered by
the court along with other proof.4 Other possible circumstances to
be considered in the determination that an apparently canceled
will is still valid are listed in Estate of Hartman," a case relied
upon in Cox. In Hartman, the court ruled that in cases of lost
wills, revocation by destruction may be inferred from the fact that
the will once existed but cannot be found at the testator's death.
To overcome this presumption, the proof must be "clear, satisfac''7
tory, and convincing.
The court in Hartman listed several factors which might be
used to rebut the lost will presumption: (1) that someone other
than the testator had possession of the will; (2) that testator was
on friendly or unfriendly terms with certain interested persons; (3)
that testator was mentally or physically incapable of destroying
the will with an intent to revoke; (4) that someone else had an
opportunity to dispose of the will and benefit thereby. 8
It must be noted that in Cox the court did not specifically
state that these factors applied to the canceled will presumption in
the same way that they applied to the lost will presumption in
Hartman. However, the court stated in Cox that the Hartman situation is "closely analogous."'9 Therefore, one might infer that the
proponents of a canceled will could advance the same arguments to
rebut the Cox presumption, as proponents of a lost will could advance to rebut the Hartman presumption.

II.

HOMESTEAD ALLOWANCE AND EXEMPT PROPERTY

In Estate of Merkel,10 the court ruled that the homestead allowance1 and the exempt property provisions1 2 of the MUPC are
fee interests of the surviving spouse (as opposed to a life estate), as
long as the spouse survives the required 120 hours.13 Merkel involved a situation in which the surviving spouse, through a guardian, filed a claim for exempt property and homestead allowance.
The surviving spouse died nine days later. The district court dismissed the claim, ruling that the homestead allowance and exempt
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

Id. at 1062.
172 Mont. 225, 563 P.2d 569 (1977).
Id. at 232, 563 P.2d at 573.
Id. at 234, 563 P.2d at 574.
Id.
Cox, Mont. -, 621 P.2d at 1061.
Mont. -,
618 P.2d 872 (1980).
MCA § 72-2-801 (1981).
MCA § 72-2-802 (1981).
MCA § 72-2-205 (1981).
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property were life estates only.
Pre-MUPC statutory law in Montana considered the homestead allowance to be merely a life estate.1 4 Neither the comments
to the Uniform Probate Code (UPC) nor courts in other UPC
states had considered the questions of whether the homestead allowance or exempt property under the UPC are life estates or fee
interests. Therefore, in Merkel, the court made a determination
that breaks new ground in the interpretation of the UPC.
The court stated three reasons for holding that the homestead
allowance and exempt property are fee interests of the surviving
spouse: (1) In passing the MUPC, the legislature chose not to identify the interests, purposely omitting the explicit "life estate" language of the former statute. And when a statute is revised, omitted
parts are ordinarily construed as annulled. (2) To construe the
statutes to require life estates would oppose the express purpose of
the MUPC-to simplify the law concerning affairs of decedents."8
Court involvement could drag on for years in transferring property
to remaindermen, hearing suits for waste, and dealing with other
concerns. (3) The family allowance statute specifically states that
the death of one entitled to it terminates his right to it." Since
this is the only statute with such a provision, the implication is
17
that the other family protections create fee interests.
III.

UNDUE INFLUENCE

In Heintz v. Vestal,"5 the court summarized the holdings of a
number of earlier Montana cases 9 and stated the definitive test to
be followed in determining whether undue influence had been employed against the decedent. Heintz involved claims against the
decedent's estate based on a promissory note and an employment
contract. The decedent was 82 years old and lived alone on a farm,
while the claimant was her farmhand. Claimant made arrangements with a bank for the drafting of the note and drove the decedent to the bank where the note was executed. The district court
found that the claimant had employed undue influence in securing
14. REVISED CODES OF MONTANA (1947) § 91-2405 specifically stated that the homestead allowance was a life estate.
15. MCA § 72-1-102 (1981).
16. MCA § 72-2-803(5) (1981) states: "The death of any person entitled to family allowance terminates his right to allowances not yet paid."
17. Merkel, Mont. -, 618 P.2d at 876-77.
18. Mont. -,
605 P.2d 606 (1980).
19. Cameron v. Cameron, 179 Mont. 219, 587 P.2d 939 (1978); Blackmer v. Blackmer,
165 Mont. 69, 525 P.2d 559 (1974); Estate of Maricich, 145 Mont. 146, 400 P.2d 873 (1965);
Hale v. Smith, 73 Mont. 481, 237 P. 214 (1925).
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the note.
In affirming that portion of the district court ruling, the supreme court stated that the test for undue influence is as follows:
(1) The influence must be such to destroy the free agency of the
influenced person with the will of another substituted. (2) The influence must be exerted to procure the result desired by the influencing party. (3) The amount of influence is determined by weighing the mental and physical health of the party being influenced
and correlating them with acts of influence which were exerted. In
addition, the court may consider the confidential relationship of
the influencing party, the physical and mental condition of the testator as it affects his ability to withstand influence, the unnaturalness of the disposition, and the demands as they may affect the
donor, taking into consideration the time, place and surrounding
circumstances.2 0
IV.

DISCRIMINATORY TRUSTS

In In re Will of Cram,21 the court held that a private person
may lawfully discriminate in regard to the beneficiaries of his estate without offending the equal protection clause of the United
States Constitution, as long as the state and its instrumentalities
are not involved; in other words, there is no state action. In doing
so, the court followed the long established doctrine of the United
States Supreme Court as enunciated in the Civil Rights Cases.2
More importantly, the court's decision in Cram aids in defining the
meaning of "state action."
Cram's will provided for a trust for the benefit of boys who
were interested in woolgrowing and who belonged to the Future
Farmers of America (FFA) of Montana and the 4-H Club of Montana. The trust provided that officials of those organizations, who
are state employees, were to choose the beneficiaries and purchase
sheep with the funds. Appellant, a girl who was otherwise qualified
to be a beneficiary, was refused a stipend. The district court denied appellant's petition to eliminate the discriminatory provisions. The district court did, however, modify the will, removing
provisions requiring state FFA and 4-H leaders to certify eligible
recipients and to be co-payees of the trust checks issued. In doing
so, the district court attempted to remove the state from any participation in a trust which discriminated against girls by benefiting
20. Heintz, __ Mont. __, 605 P.2d at 608.
21. Mont. -, 606 P.2d 145 (1980).
22. 109 U.S. 3 (1883). See also Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
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only boys.
The supreme court ruled that the district court possessed the
power to apply cy pres principles and that there was no state action involved in the modified Cram trust. The court stated that
even though the FFA and 4-H organizations are operated as part
of the state university system and the Office of Superintendent of
Public Instruction, and the modified trust requires that the recipients be members of those two organizations, mere membership in
the organizations by the chosen boys does not constitute the requisite nexus between the state and private conduct to constitute
"state action." 3 As long as private individuals rather than state
employees choose the recipients, the fact that the recipients must
belong to state-run organizations does not rise to the level of the
state acting as part of a discriminatory trust.
V.

FEES AND EXPENSES

In Estate of Weidner, 4 the court addressed the question of
payment of costs when a will is contested. The MUPC states:
When the validity or probate of a will is contested through court
action, the fees and expenses must be paid by the party contesting the validity or probate of the will, if the will in probate is
confirmed. If the probate is revoked, the costs must be paid by
the party who resisted the revocation .... 2
The court in Weidner, for the first time, interpreted the
meaning of "fees and expenses" in relation to will contests. It held
that "fees and expenses" include attorney fees as part of the expense of the proceeding to confirm the probate of a will. 2 Thus,
the ruling is very similar to the recent case of Leaseamerica Wisconsin v. State of Montana,2 7 in which the court determined that
"legal expenses" included attorney's fees.

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Cram, Mont. -,
606 P.2d at 150.
Mont. -,
P.2d -, 38 St. Rptr. 747 (1981).
MCA § 72-12-206 (1981).
Weidner, Mont. -,
P.2d -,
38 St. Rptr. at 750.
Mont. -, 625 P.2d 68 (1981).
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